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Coercive Trade Policy
By Vincent Anesi and Giovanni Facchini∗
Coercion is used by one government (the “sender”) to influence
the trade practices of another (the “target”). We build a two-
country trade model in which coercion can be exercised unilaterally
or channeled through a “weak” international organization without
enforcement powers. We show that unilateral coercion may be in-
effective, because signaling incentives lead the sender to demand a
concession so substantial to make it unacceptable to the target. If
the sender can instead commit to the international organization’s
dispute settlement mechanism, then compliance is more likely, be-
cause the latter places a cap on the sender’s incentives to signal
its resolve.
JEL: F12, F16, L11
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In international trade disputes, coercion is often used against governments
whose trade practices are deemed unfair. Trade coercion occurs when a “sender
government” makes a demand backed by threats to use retaliatory sanctions
against a “target government” if the latter does not acquiesce to this demand.
There are typically two distinct methods of trade coercion: it can be exercised
unilaterally (e.g. Eaton and Engers 1992) or through multilateral institutions
(e.g. GATT and WTO). In the case of unilateral coercion, the sender govern-
ment makes a demand and (if necessary) retaliates one-sidedly, unconstrained by
international obligations.1 In the case of multilateral coercion, the sender uses
instead an international institution’s framework for trade dispute resolution.2
While a small body of empirical literature has studied trade coercion – and
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1A typical example was Section 301 of the 1974 US Trade Act, which allowed the United States to
impose unilateral sanctions on countries whose trade practices were found to be unfair to US interests.
This clause was invoked in several occasions – for instance in the much publicized dispute with Japan over
automobiles of 1995, in which the US essentially bypassed the WTO and imposed sanctions unilaterally
(e.g. Puckett and Reynolds 1996, Schoppa 1999).
2The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism is the leading institution of this kind, and since its
inception, it has handled hundreds of cases. Several preferential trade agreements also include similar
institutions. See for instance NAFTA’s Dispute Settlement Process or MERCOSUR’s Dispute Settlement
Mechanism.
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in particular whether multilateral organizations like the GATT or WTO can in-
crease the chance of a sender government obtaining concessions from targets (e.g.
Busch 2000, Pelc 2010, Busch and Reinhardt 2000) – few if any formal analyses
explicitly incorporate both the coercion process itself and the role of the insti-
tutions through which coercion is channeled. The purpose of this paper is to
contribute towards filling this gap, by analyzing the strategic incentives underly-
ing trade coercion under three different institutional settings. In particular, we
ask two main questions: How can international trade institutions achieve their
objectives if defendants can reject adverse rulings with impunity? Given interna-
tional trade institutions’ limited enforcement powers, is unilateral or multilateral
coercion more effective in inducing the target country to concede?
To address these questions, we set up a model depicting a dispute between
two states, Home and Foreign, in which the Foreign government is dissatisfied
with the trade policy implemented by the Home government. A key feature
of trade coercion is the target government’s lack of information on the sender
government’s domestic political constraints (e.g. Eaton and Engers 1999, Busch
and Reinhardt 2000, Bagwell and Staiger 2005, Beshkar and Bond 2017). To
capture this idea, we assume that the political pressure exerted by the import-
competing sector on the government in Foreign is private information, and is
only known by the Foreign government. This political pressure plays a key role
in shaping its level of resolve — i.e. the severity of its trade sanctions against the
Home government — in a potential trade war.
Appraising the actual effectiveness of an international organization (IO) in dis-
pute settlement requires knowing what would happen if that institution did not
exist — i.e. if there were no framework of rules governing trade coercion. For this
reason, the first setting we examine is one in which unilateral coercion is the only
option. The game begins with the Foreign government making a demand. The
Home government can concede (ending the game with the implementation of the
demanded tariff), or reject it (triggering a retaliatory trade war). In other words,
it must decide which concessions are acceptable, that is, which tariff changes it
would prefer to make rather than face Foreign’s trade sanctions. Since the pre-
cise nature of these sanctions is uncertain and crucially depends on the privately
observed level of resolve of the Foreign government, the latter has incentives to
signal high levels of resolve by making excessive demands about the concessions
required from Home to avoid retaliatory measures. Our characterization of equi-
librium outcomes in this case reveals that such incentives lead the Foreign gov-
ernment to make requests that the Home government will not meet, thus causing
a retaliatory trade war — even when there exist mutually advantageous policy
concessions.
As we will show, a key factor in determining whether concessions can be ob-
tained with multilateral coercion is the extent to which the sender government
can commit not to bypass the dispute settlement process of the IO through which
coercion is channeled. To model the different strategic situations that may arise
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from differences in the sender’s ability to commit to the IO, we will examine two
distinct variants of the previous model. In the first, the Foreign government is not
allowed to bypass the IO’s dispute settlement process. As a result, multilateral
coercion is its only option available. Dispute settlement is modeled by allowing
the Foreign government to make a demand to the Home government prior to the
IO ruling. This assumption is intended to capture, e.g. the consultations stage
of WTO disputes. If the Home government does not concede to the Foreign gov-
ernment’s demand the IO issues its ruling, whereas it remains inactive otherwise.
As our aim is to investigate the effectiveness of weak international trade insti-
tutions — namely those that have no enforcement power and rely on the sender
government itself to implement any retaliatory measures — the Home govern-
ment is allowed not to comply with the ruling, thus triggering a trade war with
the Foreign government. Our analysis shows that commitment to the IO’s ruling
makes concessions more likely. Intuitively, the potential IO ruling places a cap on
the Foreign government’s incentives to signal its resolve with high demands. This
results in the latter making more moderate requests, which can be accepted by
Home. Compared with the unilateral-coercion case above, this finding provides a
possible explanation for the empirical evidence (e.g. Busch 2000, Pelc 2010) indi-
cating that, although neither GATT nor WTO have enforcement powers, a target
of trade coercion by the US is significantly less likely to concede when coercion is
unilateral than when it is multilateral.
In the second variant of the model, the Foreign government is only partially
committed to the IO’s dispute settlement process, in the sense that it can choose
between unilateral and multilateral coercion in an additional stage at the begin-
ning of the game, committing itself to that choice.3 This setting captures the
environment created by Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974. In fact, this
provision enabled the President to impose sanctions unilaterally against unfair
trade practices, eliminating the need to observe existing international obligations
(e.g. Puckett and Reynolds 1996). We show that the mere availability of the
unilateral option prevents the foreign government from obtaining concessions in
equilibrium. In fact, using multilateral coercion when unilateral coercion is avail-
able is perceived as a sign of the foreign government’s weakness. Hence, incentives
to signal higher levels of resolve to the Home government will lead the Foreign
government to make unilateral demands which, as discussed above, cannot be
accepted in equilibrium.
A large body of literature has studied international trade agreements as equi-
libria of infinitely-repeated prisoner-dilemma games, in which deviations from
the (implicit) agreements are followed by indefinite play of high-tariff Nash equi-
libria. Papers in that literature study how international organizations’ dispute
settlement procedures can facilitate cooperation – e.g. Riezman (1991), Hunger-
ford (1991), Maggi (1999), Ludema (2001), Klimenko, Ramey and Watson (2008),
3As we will discuss in section I.B, this assumption is consistent with empirical evidence on US trade
coercion.
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Lima˜o and Saggi (2008), Bagwell (2009) and Park (2011). Although strategic in-
centives in our paper do not rely on long-run interactions, our analysis shares
some important features with Bagwell (2009) and Park (2011). In particular,
Bagwell (2009) develops a two-country repeated game in which each government,
as the sender in our model, possesses some private information about the extent
of the political pressures it is confronted with. He shows that trade agreements
with weak bindings (i.e. maximal tariff levels) are preferable to agreements with
strong bindings (i.e. precise tariff levels). Interestingly, if private information
is persistent through time then signaling incentives which resemble those of our
unilateral–coercion game, may undermine the Nash-reversion threat supporting a
cooperative equilibrium. Indeed, in order not to be perceived as “weak,” govern-
ments may resist applying optimal tariffs, below their bound levels. Park (2011),
like us, shows that an international trade organization without enforcement pow-
ers may play an effective role in preventing trade wars; but the reason is different.
The author considers a two-country repeated game with imperfect private mon-
itoring, in which each country only observes an (imperfect) private signal about
the other country’s protection levels. In the absence of an IO, the private nature
of the signals about their opponents’ policies restricts the punishment schemes
that the countries can use to sustain cooperation in equilibrium. Observing both
countries’ private signals, the IO decides whether a violation has occurred and
then tells them to initiate a punishment phase based on its decision. Park shows
that, despite its lack of coercive power, the IO can help sustain the cooperative
equilibrium by changing the nature of the punishment-triggering signals from
private to public, thus relaxing informational constraints on optimal punishment
schemes.
Most papers in the literature reviewed so far model trade dispute settlement
as a set of conditions imposed on the off-the-equilibrium-path punishments that
follow deviations, not explicitly as a coercion game like ours. One notable ex-
ception is the model of sanctions developed by Eaton and Engers (1992). In
their framework a sender and a target country interact repeatedly under per-
fect information and the sender is able to commit for a limited period of time
to carry out a sanction, costly for both parties involved, if the target does not
acquiesce to a sender’s minimum request. They find that the threat of sanctions
can be effective in obtaining concessions from the target, even though sanctions
are costly to the sender and not actually used in equilibrium. In a follow-up
paper, Eaton and Engers (1999), they show how asymmetric information about
senders and targets may generate equilibria in which sanctions are imposed by
the sender on the equilibrium path, either to maintain its reputation for tough-
ness or because it cannot discriminate between complaisant and stubborn targets.
Our approach to coercion differs from theirs in two important respects. First, we
ask a different question. They are concerned with explaining why sanctions, or
the threat of sanctions, can be effective in achieving senders’ objectives in the
absence of third parties to enforce agreements between governments. In contrast,
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we are concerned with explaining how the presence of even “weak” IOs can have
a significant impact on coercion outcomes. Second, even our unilateral-coercion
benchmark approaches coercion from a different perspective. Eaton and Engers’
(1992, 1999) arguments require repeated interactions: if the sender dealt with the
target only once, then it would have no incentive to use costly sanctions or to
maintain a reputation. Our aim is to capture different strategic incentives, not
channeled through long-run interactions. In our framework, although the game
will not be repeated, the sender government is prepared to use trade sanctions be-
cause it is dissatisfied with the target’s deviation from an existing trade agreement
and, in the absence of a new agreement, increasing its tariffs would be profitable.
As it seeks to obtain as favorable terms as possible, threats of sanctions signal its
resolve in case a trade war could not be avoided. While such signaling incentives
are conducive to inefficient trade wars, we show that in the presence of an IO, an
agreement is reached even without a ruling and sanctions are not implemented on
the equilibrium path. As discussed in Section 4, this is consistent with empirical
evidence on trade disputes.4
A recent literature has taken an incomplete-contracts approach to international
trade agreements and dispute settlement — e.g. Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger
(2007), Beshkar (2010), Beshkar (2016), Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2010), Maggi
and Staiger (2011) and Beshkar and Bond (2017). Its main focus is on the design
of optimal institutions for international trade and dispute settlement in various
informational/contractual environments.5 In contrast, the IO’s dispute settle-
ment procedure is the main exogenous variable in our model. Our aim is not
to study the normative aspects of trade institutions but, instead, to provide a
positive theory of how commitment to such institutions may affect trade coercion
outcomes.
In the related context of international conflict resolution, Ho¨rner, Morelli and
Squintani (2015) also show that an IO without enforcement powers can be ef-
fective. More precisely, the authors consider a dispute between two players over
some positive surplus that shrinks if they engage in a war, the outcome of which
is determined by their privately observed types (strong or weak). The authors
compare the optimal mechanisms that minimize the probability of war under two
different third-party-intervention settings: arbitration, under which a third party
collects information privately and makes binding decisions on the outcome of the
dispute; and mediation, under which the third party also collects information but
can only make unenforceable recommendations. Interestingly they find that, de-
spite her lack of enforcement power, a mediator is as effective as an arbitrator in
4We discuss a dynamic extension of our model that would also capture the governments’ long-run
incentives in Section 5. Other recent examples are Bagwell and Staiger (2005), Martin and Vergote
(2008) and Rosendorff (2005), who analyze repeated tariff games in which, as in our model, governments
have private information about their relative valuations of import-competing sectors.
5Gilligan, Johns and Rosendorff (2010) study how variation in the strength of international courts
affects dispute settlements in a model which, like ours, incorporates complainants’ demands and defen-
dants’ (potential) concessions. Their model can be applied to international trade institutions but, while
we focus on weak institutions, their interest is in the pros and the cons of strengthening such institutions.
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preventing wars. In contrast to our model in which the IO’s ruling is exogenously
fixed, it is the mediator’s ability to use sufficiently sophisticated recommendation
strategies that allows her to circumvent the unenforceability constraint in their
model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the model,
while section II presents the main results of our analysis. In section III we dis-
cuss the substantive implications of our results and relate them to the existing
empirical evidence. Section 5 concludes.
I. The Model
The goal of this section is twofold. We start by presenting the basic structure
of the economy, and lay out next a simple model of trade coercion.
A. The Economic Environment
We consider a model with two large countries, Home and Foreign, trading
between each other, which has been used in several previous analyses of trade
negotiations.6 Each economy is characterized by three sectors, i = 0, 1, 2. All
goods are produced using a constant-returns-to-scale technology under perfect
competition. Good 0 is freely traded and serves as the numeraire; it is produced
using labor alone. We choose units so that its international and domestic prices
are both equal to one, and the aggregate labor supply, L = L, is assumed to be
large enough to sustain production of a positive amount of good 0. As a result,
in a competitive equilibrium the wage rate equals unity in each country. Goods
1 and 2 are produced instead using labor and a sector-specific input, which is
available in fixed supply. Home is abundant in sector-specific input 2, whereas
Foreign is abundant in sector-specific input 1. Consequently, Home imports good
1, while Foreign imports good 2. To simplify the analysis, we assume symmetry
in factor endowments between the two countries. The domestic and international
prices of a nonnumeraire good i are denoted by pi and pii, respectively. The rent
Ri, accruing to the specific factor used in sector i, depends only on the good’s
producer price, and can thus be expressed as Ri(pi). Industry supply is given by
Qi(pi) = ∂Ri/∂pi.
Trade policies in the two countries take the form of ad valorem import tariffs
or subsidies, denoted by τ and τ∗, and drive a wedge between domestic and
international prices.7 Focusing on the Home country, the domestic price of good
1 is thus equal to p1 = (1 + τ)pi1, with τ > 0 (τ < 0) representing an import tariff
(subsidy); the domestic price of the export good is instead equal to p2 = pi2. In
Foreign, domestic prices are given by p∗1 = pi1 and p∗2 = (1 + τ∗)pi2.
6See for instance Mayer (1981) and Conconi, Facchini and Zanardi (2012).
7This allows us to describe the preferences of the two countries in the tariff space (τ, τ∗) and to easily
characterize trade negotiations between them. As argued by Levy (1999), export subsidies and taxes are
rarely used.
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The economy is populated by a continuum of agents, and we set the population’s
size equal to one. Each agent shares the same quasi-linear and additively separable
preferences, which can be written as
(1) u(c0, c1, c2) ≡ c0 +
2∑
i=1
ui(ci),
where c0 is the consumption of the numeraire good, and ci, i = 1, 2 represent in-
stead the consumption of the other goods. The sub–utility functions are assumed
to be twice differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave.
Provided that income always exceeds the expenditure on the numeraire good,
the domestic demand for good i ∈ {1, 2} can be expressed as a function of price
alone, Di(pi). Imports of good 1 by Home can then be expressed as M1(p1) =
D1(p1)−Q1(p1), while exports are instead given by X2(p2) = Q2(p2)−D2(p2).
The international markets for goods 1 and 2 are in equilibrium when
(2) M1
(
(1 + τ)pi1
)
−X∗1 (pi1) = 0,
(3) M∗2
(
(1 + τ∗)pi2
)
−X2(pi2) = 0.
From (2) and (3) we can derive an expression for international equilibrium prices
as a function of the trade policies implemented in the two countries, i.e., pi1(τ),
pi2(τ
∗). Tariff revenues in Home are given by
(4) T(τ) = τpi1(τ)M1(τ)
and are assumed to be redistributed uniformly among all domestic residents.
In this model individuals derive income from several different sources: they all
supply one unit of labor and earn wages; they also receive the same lump sum
transfer (possibly negative) of trade policy revenues from the government and
they own some share of the specific inputs used in the production of goods 1
and 2. We assume that the Home government seeks to maximize a social welfare
function, which is defined as a weighted sum of all citizens’ income (total labor
income, industry rents and government revenues), plus consumer surplus, i.e.:
(5) W (τ, τ∗) = 1 + αR1(τ) +R2(τ∗) + T(τ) + Ω(τ) + Ω(τ∗),
where Ω(τ) ≡ u
(
D1(τ)
)
− p1D1(τ) and Ω(τ∗) ≡ u
(
D2(τ
∗)
)
− p2D2(τ∗), i.e. the
first term describes the surplus from the consumption of good 1 and the second
from the consumption of good 2. We assume that α > 1 to capture a protectionist
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bias in the setting of trade policy (Grossman and Helpman 2005).8 To simplify
notation, we do not include α as an argument of the welfare function, as it will
remain constant throughout the analysis.
0 τ
τ∗
τ˜
τ˜∗(γ0)
W
W ∗(γ0)
N
E
A
B
τa
τ∗a
CC
Figure 1. Policy preferences when γ = γ0.
The preferences of the Foreign government are given by:
(6) W ∗(τ, τ∗, γ) = 1 +R∗1(τ) + γR
∗
2(τ
∗) + T∗(τ∗) + Ω(τ∗) + Ω(τ),
where γ captures the Foreign protectionist bias, and its initial value is given
by γ0 > 1. In the remainder of the paper γ will be referred to as the Foreign
government’s type.9
As is standard in this class of models (e.g. Rosendorff 2005), we make the fol-
lowing natural assumptions about both governments’ objective functions. First,
for any given level of Home tariff τ [resp. of Foreign tariff τ∗ and type γ], W (τ, ·)
[resp. W ∗ (·, τ∗, γ)] strictly decreases with τ∗ [resp. with τ ]. This simply ensures
that, in each country, the losses incurred by domestic export firms when the other
country raises its tariff always outweigh the benefits to domestic consumers. Sec-
ond, for any given level of τ∗ [resp. of τ and γ], W (·, τ∗) [resp. W ∗ (τ, ·, γ)] first
increases and then decreases with τ [resp. with τ∗]. This ensures that W (·, τ∗)
and W ∗ (τ, ·, γ) have unique maximizers, which we denote by τ˜ and τ˜∗(γ) respec-
8For instance, this could be due to the fact that the import competing industry is politically organized
and lobbies the government in a model a` la Grossman and Helpman (1994).
9See Bagwell and Staiger (2005) for a similar setting.
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tively. (Additive separability in (5) and (6) implies that τ˜ is independent of τ∗,
and that τ˜∗(γ) is independent of τ .)
Tariffs τ˜ and τ˜∗(γ) are clearly those which would be implemented if governments
chose their policies non-cooperatively — or, using the language of the previous
literature, if they engaged in a “trade war.” Figure 1 provides an illustration for
governments’ preferences: W (resp. W ∗) describes an indifference curve for the
Home (resp. Foreign) government. A downward (resp. leftward) shift leads to
higher values of the government’s objective function. The policy pair (τ˜ , τ˜∗(γ))
lies at the intersection between the two curves and describes the coordinates of
point N . Clearly the two governments could make themselves better off if they
could agree on any tariff pair lying within the lens described by the two indiffer-
ence curves. In particular, the portion AB of the contract curve CC identifies
the set of Pareto optimal tariff pairs that improve upon the Nash equilibrium N .
Note that, as long as α and γ0 are sufficiently large, AB belong to the positive
orthant, and we will assume this to be the case. We further assume that the
initial trade agreement between the two governments, (τa, τ
∗
a ), belongs to AB.
B. A Simple Model of Trade Coercion
Our goal is to investigate whether and how different institutional arrangements
affect the outcome of trade coercion. To do so, we develop a model with two active
agents, the Home and the Foreign governments, which possibly interact with an
IO. In the preliminary stage, the Foreign government privately observes the new
value of its protectionist bias γ, which is drawn from a cumulative distribution
function F0. We assume that F0 has a continuous and strictly positive density
over some interval
[
γ, γ
]
. Note that for (and only for) expositional clarity, we
assume that there is no asymmetry of information about the Home government’s
protectionist bias, α.10
In order to justify the use of coercion by the Foreign government in the next
stages of the model, we need to make two assumptions. First, we assume that
τ˜∗(γ) > τ∗a . This ensures that the Foreign government is always prepared to raise
its tariff above the initial agreement τ∗a if the Home government does not acqui-
esce to its demands for lower Home tariffs. In addition, to accommodate cases of
multilateral coercion (i.e., within the framework of the IO), the Foreign govern-
ment’s coercive actions must be justified by a violation of the original agreement,
(τa, τ
∗
a ). To this end, we further assume that a shock has also occurred in the
Home country, which causes its government to seek an adjustment to its trade
policy away from the original agreed level, τa. Several motives can be invoked
10This assumption is totally innocuous. Indeed, additive separability of the governments’ preferences
ensures that the Foreign trade-war tariff does not depend on Home’s preferences and, therefore, that
the Home government’s actions would not imply any relevant belief updating about α. Thus, including
uncertainty about α would add nothing but notation: when making demands, the Foreign government
would anticipate the expected (as opposed to the known) response from the Home government. Moreover,
our results remain intact if we assume that the Foreign government’s set of types is a finite set.
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for this desired change. For example, it could be the result of the election of
a new government in Home, which prefers less trade than its predecessor (as in
Bown 2002). Alternatively, it could driven by a real or simply perceived import
“surge” etc.11 We assume that, as a consequence of this shock, the Home govern-
ment has increased its tariff on imports to some τ0 > τa. Note that this increase
may not necessarily be in definite violation of the existing agreement between the
the two countries: as in Maggi and Staiger (2011), one can think of the agree-
ment as an incomplete contract containing “gray areas” about the circumstances
in which exceptions should be granted. As a result, the Home government might
well deem its choice of tariff as perfectly legal. At the same time, however, the
Foreign government is dissatisfied with Home’s policy change, and has decided
to use coercion to reduce Home’s tariff, i.e. it threatens to increase τ∗a if Home
does not implement a new trade policy τ < τ0.
12 More generally, since our focus
in this paper is on the strategic aspects that underlie trade disputes themselves,
irrespective of the events that prompted them, we will follow Rosendorff (2005)
and treat the status quo policies (τ0, τ
∗
0 ) = (τ0, τ
∗
a ) as given.
The sequence of events that follow the realization of γ depends on Foreign’s
institutional arrangements for trade coercion:
(i) Absence of IO membership. — Suppose first that Foreign is not a member of
the IO, so that coercion must be unilateral. In this case, the Foreign government
threatens to increase its tariff unless the Home government acquiesces to a demand
τ ≤ τ0. If the Home government concedes, reducing its tariff from τ0 to τ ,
then Foreign does not impose any sanction. Then the policy vector (τ, τ∗0 ) is
implemented. If the Home government stands firm, then the Foreign government
carries out its threat, thereby triggering a trade war.
(ii) Full Commitment to the IO. — Suppose now that Foreign is a member
of the IO, and is fully committed to its dispute settlement process — so that
coercion must be conducted multilaterally. The process through which disputes
are settled in international trade organizations is usually long and complex. It
typically involves consultations between the sender and target (and potentially
third parties and/or mediators) to reconcile their differences by themselves, IO
panels’ hearings and parties’ rebuttals, several reports from the IO panel to the
parties and, in the absence of an early settlement, rulings and appeals. Our aim
here is to focus on the effects of incomplete information on multilateral negotiation
outcomes and, therefore, to abstract away from any other complexity that such
11See for example the debate around the 30% U.S. steel tariff introduced by the Bush administration
in 2002 (see e.g. Rosendorff 2005).
12Note that since we are interested in developing a model of coercion as opposed to bargaining, we
do not allow the Foreign government to use its tariff as a bargaining instrument when it formulates
its demand. In other words, in this model, as in Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2007), the import-
competing sector is only a “retaliation-good sector,” in the sense that the Foreign government can only
use its tariff τ∗ as a retaliation instrument when coercion is unsuccessful.
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a situation might entail. To this end, and to ease comparison with the previous
framework, we model proceedings as follows.
First, both parties observe the realization of the IO panel’s “interpretation” of
the trade agreement, τ io. The Foreign government then makes a demand τ ≤ τ0.
The Home government can concede to this demand (ending the game with the
implementation of the policy pair (τ, τ∗0 )) or reject it. In the latter case the IO
issues ruling τ io. The Home government reacts to the ruling in one of two ways:
compliance (ending the game with the implementation of policy pair
(
τ io, τ∗0
)
),
or noncompliance. If it fails to comply with the ruling, then the IO authorizes
Foreign to retaliate and a trade war ensues.
Although this is a highly abstract version of GATT-WTO proceedings, it con-
tains all the elements needed to study the impact of incomplete information and
IO membership on trade coercion, which is the main focus of the present paper.
(iii) Partial Commitment to the IO. — As explained in the introduction, it is
interesting to consider also an intermediate case in which the Foreign government
initially decides whether to coerce unilaterally or multilaterally. The remainder
of the game is as in (i) if it chooses to coerce unilaterally, and as in (ii) otherwise.
This setting captures for instance the working of the Section 301 provision of
the 1974 US Trade Act, under which action on a dispute could be unilateral or
accompanied by a GATT/WTO complaint (e.g. Busch and Reinhardt 2000, Pelc
2010).
Before we proceed with the analysis, we need to discuss three of the assump-
tions of the model. First, we treat the IO ruling τ io as exogenous. Note that our
main goal is to study how countries’ commitment to international dispute set-
tlement mechanisms affect trade coercion outcomes. Consequently, in our model
the IO dispute settlement process is taken as given. The value of τ io can simply
be interpreted as the governments’ (common) expectations about the ideal ruling
of the decisive IO-panel member. More specifically, one can think of the IO as
an organization with its own social welfare function (maximized by τ io), which
is unaffected by the political pressure from domestic actors.13 Beyond intrinsic
policy preferences concerning the current situation, this objective function may
also be influenced by other external factors — e.g. consistency with previous
rulings and setting precedents in anticipation of potential future disputes. A
second assumption of the model is that, once the Foreign government has filed
a complaint with the IO, it always complies with the IO ruling and empirical
evidence supports this view. In fact, as observed by Pelc (2010), “... once the
United States began GATT proceedings, it did not turn back to unilateralism.”
13The growing judicialization of the WTO has led to the introduction of an Appellate Body, made up
of independent legal experts, selected to deal with all the disputes that will arise in their four year terms.
Several observers have argued (e.g. Zangl 2008) that its rulings are less likely to be biased in favor of one
of the parties involved than under the pre-existing GATT arrangements.
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In particular, the United States never retaliated unilaterally nor threatened to do
so after a panel decision was reached. Finally, we assume that, even in the case of
full commitment to the IO, noncompliance to a ruling leads to a trade war. This
evidently does not mean that the IO falls apart whenever a defendant spurns its
ruling. In reality, the WTO only authorizes the complainant to retaliate on a
noncomplying defendant within certain limits.14 However, even such constrained
retaliatory trade sanctions might cause the target to retaliate in turn, leading to
escalation into further sanctions. We thus assume – for simplicity – that a trade
war follows noncompliance. It is important to note though that all of our qualita-
tive results carry over to alternative settings with constrained retaliation. In fact,
consider the case in which the IO imposes a limit, say ∆, on the increase in the
Foreign tariff, to capture the idea contained in GATT (1994) art. 22.4 that “...
the level of the suspension of the concessions or other obligations authorized by
the Dispute Settlement Body shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification
or impairment.” In this case, unsuccessful multilateral coercion would lead to a
“constrained trade war,” in which the type-γ Foreign government would imple-
ment a tariff of ς˜∗(γ) ≡ min{τ˜∗(γ), τ∗0 + ∆} (instead of τ˜∗(γ)). Nothing in the
logic of the arguments we will develop in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 would be affected,
since all the key incentives would be preserved: the Home government would still
be better off facing low rather than high Foreign government types, and trade
wars would still be more damaging to low than to high types. We return to this
in more detail when we provide intuitions for our results (see footnotes 17 and 20).
As we will see, what matters for the IO to have an impact on coercion outcomes
is that it allows the Home government to secure the tariff τ io when it believes
that the Foreign government’s type is high.
Each variant of the model describes a sequential game of incomplete infor-
mation. We solve it by looking for (pure strategy) perfect Bayesian equilibria,
which are defined as follows: (a) the Home government’s beliefs are generated by
Bayesian updating whenever possible and (b) in each stage governments’ actions
are optimal, given their beliefs and their opponents’ strategies. In order to elim-
inate equilibria which rely on implausible beliefs off the equilibrium path, we use
criterion D1 from Cho and Kreps (1987). Intuitively, this refinement requires that
if the set of Home government’s actions that make some foreign government’s type
14A well-known case in which the complainant accepted the WTO ruling, whereas the defendant did
not is the Beef-Hormone dispute between Canada and the US on the one hand and the EU on the other.
In 1989 the EU banned the importation of meat containing six artificial growth hormones approved
instead for use in the US. Under WTO rules this type of bans is allowed, but only if the part introducing
the ban is able to provide valid scientific evidence that the measure had been introduced because of a
health and safety concern. In 1997 the Dispute Settlement Body ruled against the EU, and the ruling was
confirmed by the Appellate Body in 1998. As the EU did not initially comply, an arbitrator appointed
by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body authorized the US and Canada to impose respectively a tariff
of 116.8 and 8 million US dollars per year on the EU (Kerr and Hobbs 2002). The controversy on the
matter is still ongoing. In September 2009 the EU and the US signed a memorandum of understanding,
which established a new duty free quota for grain-fed, high quality beef as a compromise. As of December
2016 tough, based on continued concerns on US beef access to the EU market, the US has taken steps
to reinstate retaliatory tariffs.
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γ willing to deviate is strictly smaller than the set of actions that make some other
type γ′ willing to deviate, then the Home government should believe that type
γ′ is infinitely more likely to deviate than γ is.15 In the remainder of the paper,
any reference to an “equilibrium” is to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium consistent
with criterion D1.16
II. International Trade Institutions and Coercion Outcomes
In this section we characterize in turn the equilibria that will emerge from the
three institutional settings described in the previous section.
A. Benchmark: Coercive Trade Policy in the Absence of the IO
Both because it is empirically relevant and because it provides a benchmark to
compare outcomes with those possible when the Foreign government can coerce
multilaterally, we start by analyzing the case in which the Foreign country is not
a member of the IO.
Trade wars and reservation demands. — To solve the game, we begin with
the last stage in which the two governments engage in a trade war. Although this
continuation game may involve the presence of asymmetric information, it always
has a unique equilibrium outcome: the Home government adopts its ideal tariff τ˜ ,
irrespective of the Foreign government’s policy choice; likewise, the type-γ Foreign
government adopts its ideal tariff τ˜∗(γ), irrespective of the Home government’s
policy choice.
Given the outcome of a trade war, consider now the Home government’s decision
of whether to concede to the Foreign government’s demand τ . Suppose that its
beliefs about γ are given by some c.d.f. F . It will concede to demand τ if and
only if its payoff from conceding exceeds its expected payoff from triggering a
trade war; that is
(7) W (τ, τ∗0 ) ≥
∫ γ
γ
W (τ˜ , τ˜∗(γ)) dF (γ) .
Let the smallest value of τ that satisfies the above inequality be denoted by
T (F ). This is the Home government’s “reservation demand,” or the minimum
demand it will accept rather than engage in a trade war. In what follows, we will
sometimes indulge in a slight abuse of notation and denote by T (γ) the Home
15This is a strengthening of the Intuitive Criterion, which has no bite in this game. See the Supple-
mentary Appendix for the formal definition.
16In order to limit the number of possible cases (without affecting the paper’s conclusions), we also
assume that in case of a tie, a player will prefer to agree than to disagree with the other player or the
IO.
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government’s reservation tariff when its beliefs assign probability 1 to type γ.
Similarly, the type-γ Foreign government’s reservation demand T ∗(γ) — that is,
the Home tariff at which the Foreign government is indifferent between settling
and engaging in a trade war — is defined as the largest value of tariff τ that
satisfies
(8) W ∗ (τ, τ∗0 , γ) ≥W ∗ (τ˜ , τ˜∗(γ), γ)
(recall that W ∗ (τ, τ∗0 , γ) decreases as τ increases).
It can be easily shown that T (γ) and T ∗(γ) are both strictly decreasing in γ.
An increase in γ causes the trade-war tariff of the Foreign government, τ˜∗(γ),
to rise. As W (τ˜ , τ˜∗(γ)) decreases with τ˜∗(γ) (and therefore with γ), the Home
government is willing to implement a lower tariff to avoid a trade war. In contrast,
applying the Envelope Theorem reveals that W ∗ (τ˜ , τ˜∗(γ), γ) increases with γ; so
that greater political pressure from its import-competing sector makes the Foreign
government less willing to tolerate high tariffs applied by Home.17 We assume
throughout our analysis that T ∗
(
γ
)
< T
(
γ
)
. Intuitively, this means that, facing
the “weakest” type of Foreign government, the Home country is only willing to
make small compromises that are not even acceptable to that type of Foreign
government: the latter’s level of resolve is too high for it to tolerate Home tariffs
above T
(
γ
)
but is at the same time too low for the Home government to concede
to demands below T ∗
(
γ
)
.18 As explained in Section 5, this assumption is made
purely for technical convenience as it allows us to avoid equilibrium existence
issues that arise if T ∗
(
γ
)
> T
(
γ
)
.
The ineffectiveness of unilateral coercion. — Can the Foreign government
obtain a concession from the Home government in equilibrium? This question is
answered in the following
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that there is no IO — so that coercion must be uni-
lateral. There exists an equilibrium and, in any equilibrium, the Foreign govern-
ment always fails to obtain a concession from the Home government.
PROOF: See Appendix A.1. 
To understand the intuition for this result, note that upon observing the de-
mand τ by the Foreign government, the Home government — uninformed about
the level of political pressure γ that has emerged in the Foreign country — up-
dates its beliefs. Given these new beliefs, say F , it concedes to τ if and only if
17It is readily checked that these key properties of T (γ) and T ∗(γ) would still hold if the IO imposed
a cap τ∗0 + ∆ on the Foreign government’s retaliatory tariff, which would then be equal to ς˜
∗(γ) ≡
min
{
τ˜∗(γ), τ∗0 + ∆
}
for each type γ. As ς˜∗(γ) may be constant on some interval of types, the resulting
reservation-tariff function for the Home government, T (γ), would only be weakly decreasing. However,
as W ∗
(
τ˜ , ς˜∗(γ), γ
)
is strictly increasing in γ, the Foreign reservation-tariff, now denoted by T ∗(γ), would
remain strictly decreasing.
18Note that we only need this condition to hold when γ = γ, which is a measure zero event.
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τ ≥ T (F ). As its reservation demand T (γ) is decreasing in γ, the best strategy for
the Foreign government is to signal high values of γ by requiring a low level of τ .
Indeed, trade wars are less costly to Foreign governments that are very sensitive
to the well–being of the import sector (characterized by a high-γ)— the Foreign
reservation demand T ∗(γ) decreases with γ — and the Foreign government is
therefore more likely to risk a trade war when γ is large. Understanding this, the
Home government rationally infers higher values of γ from a demand for a lower
tariff. Such beliefs lead the foreign policy-maker to go too far, however, and to
make requests which the Home government is not prepared to meet. This signal-
ing spiral leads all types of Foreign government to make unsuccessful demands,
and a trade war will ensue in every equilibrium.
More specifically, it is straightforward to see that there is always a separating
equilibrium in which no concession can be obtained. In such an equilibrium, all
types of Foreign government make different unacceptable demands
(
i.e., demands
below T (γ)
)
and the Home government believes that any deviation is the ac-
tion of the weakest type γ. This implies that the Home government would only
be prepared to concede to demands τ > T (γ). As the Foreign reservation de-
mand T ∗(γ) decreases with γ
(
so that T ∗(γ) ≤ T ∗(γ) < T (γ)), deviating to such
demands is not profitable for any type of Foreign government. In addition, an
equilibrium in which concessions may arise would have to be pooling — other-
wise, the Foreign types that do not obtain concessions or only modest concessions
would mimic the type(s) which obtain the best concession. What remains to es-
tablish, therefore, is that concessions in a pooling equilibrium are impossible.
Assume toward a contradiction that a subset of types, say [γ
0
, γ0] ⊆ [γ, γ], obtain
a concession τ from the Home government in some equilibrium.19 This implies
that T ∗(γ0) > τ ≥ T (F ′) > T (γ0), where F ′ represents the updated beliefs of
the Home government conditional on observing demand τ . (The last inequality
follows from the fact that the Home government is prepared to make more con-
cessions if it believes with certainty that Foreign’s type is γ0 than if it believes
that any type in [γ
0
, γ0] is possible.) Now consider a deviation from a request
τ to a smaller tariff τ ′, running the risk to trigger a trade war. As higher types
have stronger incentives to run such a risk, it turns out that reasonable beliefs
eliminate all types smaller than γ0. Being convinced that it faces a more resolved
Foreign government, the Home government is thus better off conceding to the
new demand τ ′ if it is sufficiently close to τ . This in turn makes the deviation to
τ ′ < τ profitable for the type-γ0 Foreign government; a contradiction.
B. Coercive Trade Policy with Full Commitment to the IO
We now turn to the analysis of the consequences of full commitment to the IO
on trade coercion outcomes. One of the questions this paper seeks to answer is
19The assumption that this subset is an interval is only made for expositional convenience. The proof
of the proposition considers all possible subsets of [γ, γ].
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how international trade institutions, despite their lack of enforcement power, can
be effective in settling disputes. We have just shown how the logic of unilateral
trade coercion locks the Foreign government into signaling spirals leading to trade
wars. Despite being unable to enforce its rulings, can the IO’s dispute settlement
process do a better job of obtaining concessions from the Home government?
The answer is positive, and the intuition is that full commitment to the IO’s
dispute settlement process may offer the Foreign government an opportunity to
break the spiral of unilateral coercion. To see how this can occur in equilibrium,
suppose that τ io ≥ T (F0). Consider first the stage in which the Home govern-
ment must decide whether or not to comply with the IO ruling τ io. Failure to
comply would trigger a trade war. Therefore, it follows from the analysis of the
trade-war stage we have developed in the previous section that it chooses to com-
ply if and only if τ io ≥ T (F ), where the c.d.f. F stands for the updated beliefs
about the Foreign government’s type γ at this stage. This implies that, when
confronted with some demand τ from the Foreign government, the Home govern-
ment’s optimal strategy is to concede if and only if τ ≥ max{τ io, T (F )}. As long
as T (F ) > τ io, the same signaling incentives as under unilateral coercion drive
the Foreign government to deviate from successful demands by asking for lower
tariffs, which signal high values of γ and reduce the Home government’s reserva-
tion tariff T (F ). When T (F ) ≤ τ io, however, the Home government’s reservation
demand becomes equal to τ io and cannot be reduced any further. Believing that
the Foreign government’s type is high, the Home government can secure the tariff
τ io instead of risking a costly trade war. Thus, the presence of the IO mitigates
the connection between the Foreign government’s type and the trade-war payoffs.
In particular, if all types of Foreign government demand τ io, then the Home gov-
ernment’s beliefs (correctly derived from Bayes’ rule) must be given by F0. As
τ io ≥ T (F0), the Home government concedes to this demand and a trade war is
avoided. Since W ∗(τ, τ∗0 , γ) strictly decreases with τ for all γ, it follows that no
type of Foreign government can profitably deviate: the Home government would
always be better off implementing the tariff τ io than conceding to lower demands.
We conclude that a trade war can be avoided if τ io ≥ T (F0).20
Our next result shows that the condition τ io ≥ T (F0) is also necessary for a
trade war to be avoided. If τ io is too low then, as in the case of unilateral coercion,
the Foreign government’s demands spiral down to unacceptable levels leading to
a trade war.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose the Foreign government is fully committed to the IO
— so that coercion must be multilateral. There always exists an equilibrium, and
the following is true in any equilibrium:
20Note that the logic of this argument would remain unaltered if T (γ) and T ∗(γ) were replaced by
the reservation-tariff functions T (γ) and T ∗(γ), defined in footnote 17 for the case where the Foreign
government’s retaliatory tariff is constrained by the IO. In particular, as T ∗(γ) is a strictly decreasing
function — i.e. trade wars are less damaging to the Foreign government as its type increases — signaling
incentives and the IO ruling would play the same role as described above.
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(i) If τ io ≥ T (F0), then: either all types of Foreign government obtain the
concession τ io; or they all make unsuccessful demands following which the Home
government complies with the IO ruling.
(ii) if τ io < T (F0), then all types of Foreign government make unsuccessful
demands following which the Home government fails to comply with the IO ruling.
PROOF: See Appendix A.2. 
Combined with Proposition 1, Proposition 2 shows that an IO can affect the
outcome of trade coercion and prevent trade wars, even though it has no en-
forcement power. It also suggests a possible explanation for why trade coercion
appears to be more effective in obtaining concessions from target governments
when conducted multilaterally. We will elaborate on the empirical and normative
implications of the equilibrium analysis in Section III.
C. Coercive Trade Policy with Partial Commitment to the IO
Under partial commitment to the IO, the Foreign government is allowed to
choose whether to coerce the Home government unilaterally or multilaterally.
Suppose that τ io ≥ T (F0), and that the Foreign government’s type γ satisfies
T (γ) < τ io < T ∗(γ), so that both countries are better off implementing τ io
than engaging in a trade war. Our analysis so far reveals that the signaling
incentives inherent in unilateral coercion would lead the Foreign government to
make inefficient demands to the Home government. To avoid this outcome, the
type-γ Foreign government would therefore be expected to adopt multilateral
coercion. Some authors argue, however, that taking a trade dispute to an IO
signals a lack of resolve — i.e., a low γ — by the sender government (e.g. Reinhardt
2000, Pelc 2010). The next proposition provides a formalization of their argument.
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose the Foreign government is only partially committed
to the IO — so that it can choose between unilateral and multilateral coercion.
There exists an equilibrium in which all types of Foreign government coerce uni-
laterally and fail to obtain a concession. In addition, a trade war arises with
probability one in any equilibrium.
PROOF: See Appendix A.3. 
In other words, partial commitment to the IO yields the same outcome as
absence of membership: In both cases, the Foreign government fails to obtain a
concession from the Home government, and a trade war ensues.
Note though that the Foreign government’s coercive policy has now two com-
ponents: the demand τ and the method of coercion (unilateral vs. multilateral)
through which this demand is made. A deviation from multilateral to unilateral
coercion in this case conveys the same signal as a deviation to a lower tariff de-
mand in the absence of an IO: the Home government therefore anticipates tougher
retaliatory measures in case of a trade war. As in the unilateral-coercion game,
such beliefs induce the Home government to concede to lower unilateral demands.
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This in turn drives the Foreign government to (unilaterally) ask for even lower
tariffs until its demands become unacceptable.
These incentives to coerce unilaterally to signal high resolve can only disappear
when in equilibrium all types of Foreign government make unsuccessful demands
(either unilaterally or multilaterally), thus leading to a trade war. In this case,
the Home government interprets any deviation by its foreign counterpart as an
attempt to escape this outcome and, consequently, infers that the Foreign gov-
ernment’s type γ must be low. It is therefore optimal for the Home government
to only accept demands so high that the Foreign government prefers to engage in
a trade war.
III. Implications
Our theoretical model provides novel insights on the influence of international
trade institutions on coercion outcomes. Importantly, our results are consistent
with the stylized facts that have been uncovered in the existing empirical litera-
ture. In this section we briefly review these empirical findings and explain how
they relate to our analysis.
Unilateral vs. multilateral coercion: the influence of international trade
institutions. — Busch and Reinhardt (2000) observe that, during the GATT
period, only two-fifths of the rulings in favor of the complainant resulted in full
compliance by the defendant — whereas in nearly a third of the cases, defendants
failed to comply at all. Even though the establishment of the WTO dispute set-
tlement mechanism improved the situation, as Rossmiller (1994) pointed out, the
WTO remains a “court with no bailiff.” These observations prompt the following
question: Can a multilateral institution influence coercion outcomes despite its
lack of enforcement power? Empirical evidence uncovered by Pelc (2010), sug-
gests that this is indeed the case. Focusing on the US experience between 1975
and 2000, he finds that disputes that went through the GATT, rather than relying
only on Section 301, are 34 percentage points more likely to result in a concession.
Pelc (2010) suggests that it is the perceived illegitimacy of unilateral coer-
cion and the importance of reputation which decrease the likelihood of a target
conceding. While resistance to institutionally constrained demands entails the
reputational cost of being branded a violator, resistance to unilateral threats —
regarded as illegitimate by the rest of the world — yields a reputational benefit: It
decreases the likelihood of being unilaterally targeted again in the future. Our for-
mal analysis provides an alternative rationale, which focuses on the role played by
the sender government’s incentives. On the one hand, unilateral coercion creates
signaling spirals leading the sender government to make unacceptable demands.
On the other, commitment to a multilateral organization can break these spirals
and allow the sender government to obtain concessions.
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Early dispute settlements. — Analyzing evidence on more than 600 GATT/WTO
disputes from 1948 through 1999, Busch and Reinhardt (2000) observe that in a
majority of cases (about 55%), no panel was ever established, and a further 8%
of them ended prior to the issuance of a panel report. Paraphrasing them, a key
question is why should target governments settle early given that they can spurn
adverse rulings with impunity. They argue that the source of early concessions
lies in the normative power of GATT/WTO rulings and in the pressure to abide
by the norm: An adverse ruling may weaken the target government’s political
position in its own country, as well as its position in ongoing multilateral trade
talks. As a result, if the target government is uncertain about the IO ruling, then
it may prefer to concede beforehand.
Consistently with the evidence, Proposition 2(i) shows that pre-ruling settle-
ments may occur in equilibrium.21 Importantly though, in our setting, the mecha-
nism at work is different: IO rulings do not convey any normative or reputational
costs. When the Foreign government anticipates a “high tariff” IO ruling (i.e.
when τ io ≥ T (F0)), it expects the Home government to comply with this rul-
ing. This leads the Foreign government to abandon aggressive strategies, and to
make more accommodating demands to which the Home government is willing
to concede.22 Thus, it is mainly the sender government’s (rather than target’s)
incentives which are affected by the prospect of the IO decision.
An alternative rationale for international trade agreements. — Our
model suggests a possible explanation for another empirical puzzle: Given that
membership in an international trade organization may limit the (coercive) policy
discretion of a national government, why would the latter choose to join a supra-
national body? Most of the existing literature on this topic suggests that states
become members of such institutions to solve the coordination problem created
by the terms of trade externality from tariffs (e.g. Bagwell and Staiger 1999).
Our analysis reveals, however, that another driving force may emanate from in-
formational asymmetries in trade coercion. By helping to explain why demands
channeled through the multilateral system may be more successful than unilateral
demands, our model provides a new rationale for states’ commitment to multi-
lateral institutions.
To see this, suppose that we add an initial stage to the game in which the
Foreign government decides whether or not to fully commit to the IO. If τ io <
T (F0), then it is indifferent between all institutional arrangements: a trade war is
inevitable. Suppose instead that T (F0) ≤ τ io ≤ T ∗(γ). An immediate corollary
of Propositions 1-3 is that, in this case, the Foreign government is better-off fully
committing to the IO.
21The proof of Proposition 2 (Section A.2 in the Appendix) shows that something even stronger is
true if τ io > T ∗ (γ): in all equilibria the Foreign government obtains an early concession from the Home
government.
22In fact, Busch and Reinhardt (2000) point out that among those disputes ending prior to a ruling,
67% exhibit full or partial concession by the target government.
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The role of commitment to international organizations. — Proposition 3
shows that institutions allowing sender governments to choose between unilat-
eralism and multilateralism can reduce the effectiveness of coercion. A leading
historical example of the coexistence of these two coercion methods is represented
by Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974. This provision allowed the United
States to take a number of unilateral retaliatory actions against any foreign mea-
sures deemed to violate existing agreements or otherwise impeding its interests.
At the same time, the US retained access to the dispute settlement system pro-
vided by the GATT-WTO (Pelc 2010).
As argued by Pelc (2010) the availability of unilateral coercion did not deliver
the expected results, and in fact the US “ultimately found it in its interest to
... push for greater formal constraints in the Uruguay Round that ultimately
raised the costs of unilateralism further.” In our model, if we allowed the Foreign
government to choose between full and partial commitment to the IO, then it
would strictly prefer the former whenever T (F0) ≤ τ io < T ∗(γ). The Foreign
government would indeed be better off making a successful demand τ io under full
commitment (Proposition 2) than making an unsuccessful demand under partial
commitment (Proposition 3). Unlike Pelc’s explanation based on the illegitimacy
of unilateral coercion, our result though stems from the Foreign government’s
strategic incentives created by the presence of a unilateral option. Even though
the Foreign government would be better off if this option were not available,
incentives to signal higher levels of resolve to the Home government by deviating
from multilateral to unilateral coercion eventually lead the Foreign government to
make unacceptable demands (Subsection 3.3). These incentives are reminiscent
of Reinhardt (2000) observation that taking a dispute to the GATT was a signal
of the complainant’s lack of resolve.
IV. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Summary. — This paper is a first attempt at analyzing the strategic interactions
that underlie coercive trade policy. We have studied trade coercion in settings
where sender governments may show their resolve by demanding more concessions
from target governments. We have seen how the temptation to exaggerate can
reduce the likelihood of targets conceding. This problem is especially severe
when the sender government is not (fully) committed to a multilateral dispute
settlement mechanism. Then, unbound by international commitments, the sender
may make excessive demands which are unacceptable to the target. Institutions
through which demands are channeled thus matter to coercion outcomes. In
accordance with empirical evidence, our results indicate that full commitment to
(even weak) multilateral trade institutions makes trade coercion more effective in
obtaining concessions from target governments.
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Mixed strategies and the T ∗(γ) > T (γ) case. — The intuitions behind Proposi-
tions 1 and 2, as well as their proofs, rest on two assumptions: firstly, as we focus
on pure strategy equilibria, the Home government is not allowed to random-
ize between conceding and not conceding to the Foreign government demands;
and secondly, we concentrate on cases where T ∗(γ) < T (γ). Though these as-
sumptions ease the exposition, make our results sharper and allow us to avoid
equilibrium existence issues, we show in the supplementary appendix that, with-
out them, our main conclusions remain intact. Indeed, allowing the governments
to use mixed strategies while sill assuming that T ∗(γ) < T (γ) leaves the results
unchanged. In the absence of the IO, a trade war is the only possible equilibrium
outcome: an equilibrium in which the Foreign government obtains a concession
with a positive probability would require some subset of types (including γ) to
pool and, by the same logic as in the case of pure strategy equilibria, incentives
to signal high levels of resolve would then lead the highest types in that subset
to (profitably) deviate by successfully demanding lower tariffs. Such profitable
deviations become impossible in the presence of the IO if all types of Foreign
government demand τ io ≥ T (F0), as the Home government can always comply
with the IO ruling. The possibility of randomization does not affect the strategic
incentives that underlie Propositions 2 and 3, which remain unchanged — except
in the knife-edge case where τ io is exactly equal to T (F0).
23
Assuming T ∗(γ) > T (γ) creates equilibrium existence problems: there does
not exist a pure strategy equilibrium in the model without IO, and existence of a
mixed strategy equilibrium requires additional conditions on the W and W ∗ func-
tions (discussed in the supplementary appendix S3). Though less extreme than
in the T ∗(γ) < T (γ) case, the conclusion from the analysis of mixed-strategy
equilibria for the model without the IO is still a negative one: a trade war arises
with positive probability in any equilibrium.24 More specifically, signaling incen-
tives again rule out successful demands by pooling types and, therefore, every
equilibrium must have the following (partially) separating structure: there exists
a threshold γˆ ∈ (γ, γ] for the Foreign government’s type such that every type
γ < γˆ makes demand T (γ) which the (indifferent) Home government concedes
to with a probability α(γ), where α(γ) is a strictly decreasing function, and ev-
ery type γ > γˆ ends up in a trade war with probability one. It follows that a
trade war cannot be avoided with certainty unless the realization of the Foreign
government’s type is exactly equal to γ, which is a probability-zero event.25 The
analysis of the equilibria for the model with the IO generates the same conclu-
sion as in the T ∗(γ) < T (γ) case: if τ io > T (F0), then τ io is the only possible
outcome and a trade war never occurs in equilibrium. The basic intuition behind
23If τ io = T (F0), then there may also be equilibria in which the Home government, indifferent between
conceding to τ io and a trade war, chooses a trade war with positive probability.
24Of course, there cannot be an equilibrium in which all types of Foreign government end up in a trade
war if T ∗(γ) > T (γ), as type γ could profitably deviate by making a successful demand in
(
T (γ), T ∗(γ)
)
.
25In the knife-edge case where T ∗(γ) = T (γ), there can also be a pure strategy equilibrium in which
type-γ is the only type of Foreign government that obtains a concession with positive probability.
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this result is that: (i) demanding lower tariffs to signal high levels of resolve is
no longer a profitable deviation from a pooling equilibrium in which all types of
Foreign government demand τ io ≥ T (F0), as the Home government is better off
complying with the IO ruling rather than conceding to lower tariff; and (ii) equi-
libria with a partially separating structure as above cannot exist in the presence
of the IO, as the (partially) informed Home government prefers complying to its
ruling τ io > T (F0) rather than engaging in a trade war with the highest types
of Foreign government. If the Foreign government can choose between unilateral
and multilateral coercion, then we obtain a counterpart of Proposition 3: in any
equilibrium, a trade war occurs with positive probability whenever the Foreign
government’s type exceeds γ (which is itself a probability-one event). We thus
conclude that, as in the T ∗(γ) < T (γ) case, the IO can be effective in preventing
trade wars despite its lack of enforcement power and, in particular, the Foreign
government is more likely to obtain concessions from the Home government by
using multilateral coercion rather than unilateral coercion. Moreover, allowing
the Foreign government to choose between these two modes of coercion can make
coercion less effective.
Beyond trade coercion. — Proposition 1 is reminiscent of the unraveling re-
sult obtained in disclosure games — e.g. Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981).26
Interestingly, however, while the unraveling phenomenon in disclosure games re-
sults from the privately-informed agents’ ability to reveal their types directly, the
sort of unraveling of pooling equilibria in our unilateral-coercion game follows
from the Home government’s inferences from the Foreign government’s actions.
As we saw in Subsection 3.1, criterion D1 implies that, in a putative pooling
equilibrium, the Home government interprets deviations from a successful de-
mand as certainly coming from the highest pooling type, thus allowing the latter
to effectively disclose its private information (and profitably deviate) by making
more aggressive demands. Complete breakdowns have been shown to occur in
other bargaining processes with adverse selection, but the agents’ failure to come
to agreement (irrespective of their types) in those alternative settings stems from
different mechanisms — e.g., rational expectations in Milgrom and Stokey (1982);
or sequential offers in Vincent (1989).
Note that the logic of Proposition 1 can be extended to any bargaining or con-
tracting environments beyond trade dispute settlement that possess the following
key properties: (i) a privately-informed party (the “sender”) makes a take-it-
or-leave-it offer τ to another party (the “receiver”), which determines how the
surplus generated by an agreement would be split between the two parties; (ii)
the receiver’s benefit from any agreement is monotonic, say increasing, in the
sender’s type, γ; and (iii) the relative cost to the sender of deviating from a
26We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to the analogy between the two results.
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successful offer τ to a more demanding offer τ ′ — measured by the ratio
[Sender’s payoff under agreement τ ]− [Sender’s payoff if no agreement]
[Sender’s payoff under agreement τ ′]− [Sender’s payoff if no agreement]
— is decreasing in her type. It is the latter condition, coupled with criterion
D1, that leads to the “unraveling” of the pooling PBEs in which offers would be
successful: as the highest pooling type has the lowest relative cost of deviating
from τ to τ ′, the receiver is convinced that a deviation to τ ′ must come from this
type and, therefore, accepts τ ′. This makes the deviation profitable to the highest
pooling type. Property (iii) typically holds in bargaining situations (lemons mar-
kets, international conflict resolution, . . . ) where the proposer’s outside option
improves with its type.
Research avenues. — There are a number of research avenues opened up by our
results, three of which we will briefly discuss. First, our positive theory of the
impact of multilateral institutions on trade coercion outcomes naturally prompts
a normative question: What would an optimal dispute settlement mechanism be
in the presence of informational asymmetries?27 Answering this question would
require a richer framework, i.e. one that would further our understanding of
the effects of settlement mechanisms both on membership in international trade
institutions and on target governments’ policy choices that are likely to trigger
coercive responses.
As we noted at the outset (see footnote 12), our analysis focused on coercion
itself and not on its ultimate origin. It would be interesting to investigate why
do dissatisfied governments use coercion instead of potentially more efficient bar-
gaining approaches. Trade coercion typically involves two policy instruments:
the target’s trade policy which is the source of the sender’s discontent, and the
sender’s policy which is only used as a retaliation instrument. By focusing its
demand on the former instrument, the sender government leaves out mutually
advantageous agreements which would be available if its demand would involve
instead a combination of both instruments.
Finally, the mechanisms of trade coercion put forward in this paper can be cap-
tured with our simple one-period model, in which sender and target governments
do not have to anticipate further dealings with each other. Consider a dynamic
extension of this model in which, whenever the target would either concede to the
sender’s demand or comply to the IO ruling, the same one-period game would
be repeated. If the sender’s type were persistent across periods, as in Bagwell
(2009), then governments would have to anticipate the future consequences of
their choices. In particular, this would exacerbate the signaling incentives that
arise in the one-period model, especially in cases where there is no IO or the
27Maggi and Staiger (2011) answer a similar question, but in a complete-information setting where
states of the world are “vague” and subject to interpretation by contracting governments.
24 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
sender is only partially committed to the IO: the possibility of future interactions
would increase the sender’s expected benefits from signaling high levels of resolve
with more aggressive (unilateral) demands. In addition, repeated interactions
would create reputational incentives for the target that could also lead to trade
wars. Indeed, if the target’s type were also private information (and persistent
over time), then it would have incentives to reject the sender’s demands, so as
to be perceived as “tough” in future periods.28 But we leave this as a topic for
future research.
28Pelc (2010) informally discusses such incentives.
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Mathematical Appendix
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, we must show that: (i) in any equilibrium of the game
without the IO, the Home government never concedes to the Foreign government’s
demands; and (ii) there exists an equilibrium in which the Home government never
concedes to the Foreign government’s demands.
Claim 1: Suppose that the Foreign government can only coerce unilaterally. In
any equilibrium, the Home government never concedes to its demands.
PROOF: First of all, observe that only one demand can successfully be made in
equilibrium. To see this, suppose that two different demands τ1 and τ2 are made
successfully in equilibrium by types γ1 and γ2, respectively. Assume without loss
of generality that τ1 < τ2. By definition of an equilibrium, type γ2 must find
it profitable to make successful demand τ2; hence, T
∗ (γ2) ≥ τ2 > τ1. But this
implies that type γ2 could profitably deviate by making claim τ1: W
∗ (τ1, τ∗0 , γ2) >
W ∗ (τ2, τ∗0 , γ2).
Now we establish the claim in two steps: (1) we first show that if a demand is
successful in equilibrium, then it must emanate from a single type; and (2) we
then show that this is impossible in equilibrium.
(1) We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that multiple types make a successful
demand, say τ , in some equilibrium. From our initial observation above, all the
other equilibrium demands are unsuccessful. Let Γτ ⊆
[
γ, γ
]
be the set of types
that demand τ , and let γsup ≡ sup Γτ (observe that, by assumption, γsup ∈
(
γ, γ
]
).
By definition of a PBE, we must have τ ≤ T ∗(γ) for all γ ∈ Γτ — otherwise, some
type in Γτ could profitably deviate by making an unacceptable demand — and,
therefore, τ ≤ T ∗ (γsup). As T ∗(γ) is a strictly decreasing function, this implies
that τ < T ∗(γ) for all γ < γsup; so that all types γ < γsup strictly prefer τ to
a trade war. Hence, in equilibrium, all types γ < γsup must make the unique
successful demand τ . Furthermore, by definition of a PBE, all types γ > γsup
must prefer a trade war to τ : τ > T ∗(γ) for every γ > γsup (recall that indifferent
types choose to avoid a trade war). By continuity of T ∗(·), therefore, we must
have T ∗ (γsup) = τ . Being indifferent between τ and a trade war, the type-γsup
Foreign government chooses τ . We have thus established that Γτ =
[
γ, γsup
]
.
Confronted with demand τ , the Home government — whose updated beliefs
Fτ assign a probability of 1 to the event “γ ∈
[
γ, γsup
]
” — optimally chooses to
concede in the equilibrium under consideration. As the distribution of types has
full support on
[
γ, γmax
]
, this implies that τ ≥ T (Fτ ) > T (γsup).
Now take any tariff τ ′ ∈ (T (γsup) , τ), and observe that no type of Foreign
government demands τ ′ in equilibrium. Indeed, by definition, all types in Γτ
demand τ 6= τ ′. As for types γ outside Γτ , they must be greater than γsup.
Therefore, if type γ > γsup demanded τ ′ > T (γsup) > T (γ), then the Home
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government would concede, thus contradicting our previous result that only one
demand can be successful in equilibrium. All the premises of Lemma 1 in the
supplementary appendix are thus satisfied: When confronted with demand τ ′, the
Home government believes that the Foreign government’s type is lower than γsup
with probability 0. As τ ′ > T (γsup), the Home government concedes to demand
τ ′ (off the equilibrium path). As T ∗ (γsup) > τ ′, this implies that demanding τ ′
is a profitable deviation for the type-γsup Foreign government, giving the desired
contradiction. As a consequence, Γτ is either a singleton or an empty set.
(2) Suppose γτ is the unique type that makes a successful demand τ in some
equilibrium. Bayesian updating implies that demand τ fully reveals the type of
the Foreign government. Therefore, T (γτ ) ≤ τ ≤ T ∗ (γτ ) — otherwise either the
Home government or the type-γτ Foreign government could profitably deviate
from their equilibrium strategies. From our assumption that T ∗
(
γ
)
< T
(
γ
)
,
this in turn implies that γτ 6= γ. Now take any type γ < γτ . By assumption, a
trade war occurs when the Foreign government is of type γ (γτ is the only type
that makes a successful demand). As T ∗(γ) > T ∗ (γτ ) ≥ τ , however, the type-γ
Foreign government strictly prefers τ to a trade war. It could therefore profitably
deviate by making the successful demand τ . Combined with (1), this proves that
in any equilibrium all types of Foreign government make unsuccessful demands.

Claim 2: There exists an equilibrium of the game without the IO, in which the
Home government never concedes to the Foreign government’s demands.
PROOF: Let k be a strictly positive number and consider the following strategy
profile and beliefs: The type-γ Foreign government demands a tariff τk(γ) ≡
T (γ) − k; the Home government’s strategy when confronted with a demand τ is
to concede if and only if τ ≥ T (γ); it believes that the Foreign government is of
type γ with probability 1 when confronted with demand τk(γ), for all γ ∈
[
γ, γ
]
,
and that it is of type γ when confronted with any other demand.
It is readily checked that the Home government’s beliefs satisfy Bayes’ rule
whenever possible. By Lemma 2 in the supplementary appendix, they also satisfy
Criterion D1. It also readily checked that, given these beliefs, the Home govern-
ment’s strategy is a best response to the Foreign government’s: given its beliefs,
accepting any offer below [resp. above] T
(
γ
)
would make the Home government
strictly worse-off [resp. better-off] than triggering a retaliatory trade war. Fi-
nally, as the Home government rejects any demand below T
(
γ
)
, the only possible
deviation for the Foreign government would be to make a demand τ ≥ T (γ).
But, as T
(
γ
)
> T ∗
(
γ
) ≥ T ∗(γ) for all types γ ∈ [γ, γ], such a deviation would
not be profitable.

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A2. Proof of Proposition 2
PROOF: We prove Proposition 2 in five steps. Steps 1 and 2 show that, in any
equilibrium, either all types of Foreign government successfully demand τ io or
they all make unsuccessful demands. Step 3 shows that all types successfully
demand τ io in equilibrium if and only if τ io ≥ T (F0). Finally, Step 4 shows that
a trade war never arises in equilibrium when τ io ≥ T (F0), and that all types
obtain concession τ io when τ io > T ∗ (γ). Finally, Step 5 proves existence of and
characterizes equilibria when τ io < T (F0), showing that: all types of Foreign
government fail to obtain a concession from the Home government; and the latter
never complies with the IO ruling — thus completing the proof of the proposition.
Step 1: If the Foreign government makes a successful demand in equilibrium,
then this demand must be τ io.
Consider an equilibrium in which a demand τ is successfully made by a nonempty
set of Foreign-government types Γτ . Let F be the Home government’s updated
beliefs after receiving this demand. Obviously, τ is the only successful proposal
made in equilibrium — otherwise all types making the highest demands could
profitably deviate by making the lowest demand. As it is optimal for the Home
government to concede to τ , we must have τ ≥ τ io.
Now suppose by contradiction that τ > τ io. As T ∗ is a decreasing function
and indifferent players prefer agreements over disagreements, the set of types
demanding τ must be of the form
[
γ, γˆ
]
, with γˆ ∈ [γ, γ]. We distinguish between
two different cases:
• Case 1: γˆ > γ. In this case, τ ≥ max{T (F ), τ io} ≥ T (F ) > T (γˆ). As
any other equilibrium demand τˆ 6= τ is unsuccessful, we must have τˆ < T (F̂ ),
where F̂ represents the Home government’s updated beliefs after observing τˆ .
Moreover, as any such demand emanates from types γ > γˆ (and T is strictly
decreasing), we must also have T (F̂ ) ≤ T (γˆ). It follows that no demand in(
T (γˆ), τ
)
is made on the equilibrium path. Now consider a deviation from τ
to τ ′ ∈ (max{T (γˆ) , τ io} , τ). By Lemma 3 in the supplementary appendix,
reasonable beliefs F ′ must assign zero probability to the event {γ < γˆ} following
demand τ ′. This implies that T (F ′) ≤ T (γˆ) < τ ′, which in turn implies that
demand τ ′ < τ would be successful. By definition of a PBE, this is impossible:
all types in
[
γ, γˆ
]
can profitably deviate.
• Case 2: γˆ = γ. In this case, demand τ reveals that the Foreign government’s
type is γ. As it is optimal for the Home government to concede to τ , we must
have τ ≥ max{T (γ) , τ io} ≥ T (γ) > T ∗ (γ). But this implies that the type-γ
Foreign government could profitably deviate by making an unacceptable demand
τ ′ < τ io (whether this leads to compliance with τ io or with a trade war, it ends
up strictly better off).
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Step 2: In any equilibrium, either all types of Foreign government successfully
demand τ io or they all make unsuccessful demands.
From Step 1, to prove this statement, it suffices to show that, in any equilib-
rium, if some type successfully demands τ io then all types do. We proceed by
contradiction: Suppose that a nonempty subset of types Γio 6= [γ, γ] make the
only successful demand τ io in some equilibrium. As T ∗(γ) is a strictly decreas-
ing function (and indifferent types are assumed to prefer a successful over an
unsuccessful demand), Γio must be of the form
[
γ, γˆ
]
with γˆ ≥ γ.
Let F represent the Home government’s beliefs when it receives demand τ io.
As it concedes to τ io in equilibrium, τ io ≥ max{T (F ), τ io} ≥ T (F ). From our
initial assumption, there must be a type γ′ outside
[
γ, γˆ
]
which makes an un-
successful demand, say τ ′, in equilibrium. Bayesian updating implies that the
Home government’s beliefs assign zero probability to the event {γ ≤ γˆ} follow-
ing demand τ ′. As T (·) is strictly decreasing in γ, this in turn implies that
τ io ≥ T (F ) ≥ T (γˆ) ≥ T (F ′) where F ′ represents the Home government’s be-
liefs following demand τ ′. Hence, the Home government complies with the IO
ruling after rejecting demand τ ′ in this equilibrium, leaving the type-γ′ Foreign
government indifferent between its unsuccessful equilibrium demand τ ′ and the
successful demand τ io. According to our indifference condition, it should then
demand τ io instead of τ ′.
Step 3: There is an equilibrium in which all types make a successful demand if
and only if T (F0) ≤ τ io.
Necessity. If all types of Foreign government demand τ io in equilibrium, then
the Home government’s beliefs when receiving this demand are given by F0. As
a consequence, we must have τ io ≥ max{T (F0) , τ io} ≥ T (F0).
Sufficiency. Suppose that T (F0) ≤ τ io, and consider the following strategy
profile and beliefs: All types of Foreign government demand τ io; the Home gov-
ernment concedes to (multilateral) demand τ if and only if τ ≥ τ io, and always
accepts the IO’s ruling; it maintains its initial beliefs F0 if it receives demand τ
io,
and believes that the Foreign government is of type γ otherwise.
As τ io ≥ T (F0) > T (γ), the Home government’s beliefs ensure that it is always
optimal for it to comply with the IO ruling and to concede to demand τ ≥ τ io
from the Foreign government. Anticipating that it will get payoff W
(
τ io, τ∗0
)
if it
does not concede to the Foreign government’s demand, it is also optimal for the
Home government not to concede to any τ < τ io.
Given the Home government’s strategy, the Foreign government has two op-
tions: (i) to make a successful demand τ ≥ τ io and thus get a payoff ofW ∗ (τ, τ∗0 , γ);
or (ii) to make an unsuccessful demand and thus get a payoff of W ∗
(
τ io, τ∗0 , γ
)
.
As W ∗ (·, τ∗0 , γ) is a strictly decreasing function for all γ ∈ Γ, demanding τ io is
the best strategy for any type of Foreign government.
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE COERCIVE TRADE POLICY 29
Finally, it is readily checked that the Home government’s beliefs satisfy Bayes’
rule whenever possible. Moreover, by Lemma 4 in the supplementary appendix,
they are reasonable.
Step 4: If τ io ≥ T (F0), then a trade war never arises in equilibrium. In
addition, if τ io > T ∗ (γ) then all types of Foreign government make successful
demands in any equilibrium.
Suppose that τ io ≥ T (F0). To prove the statements above, we must first
show that the Home government complies with the IO ruling whenever it rejects
a demand from the Foreign government on the equilibrium path. To this end,
consider an equilibrium — say σ — in which some type of Foreign government
makes an unsuccessful demand. From Step 2, this implies that all types make
unsuccessful demands. Let T σ be the set of demands made by all types of Foreign
government in σ, and let {Γτ}τ∈Tσ be a partition of
[
γ, γ
]
such that all types in
Γτ demand τ in equilibrium. Suppose first that the Home government rejects
the IO ruling after rejecting any demand τ ∈ T σ. Letting Fτ denote the Home
government’s beliefs following demand τ , this would imply that τ io < T (Fτ ) for
all τ ∈ T σ; contradicting our assumption that τ io ≥ T (F0).
Suppose now that T σ can be partitioned into two nonempty, disjoint subsets T1
and T2 such that the Home government always concedes [resp. does not always
concede] to the IO ruling after rejecting any τ ∈ T1 [resp. any τ ∈ T2]. In
particular, observe that if a type γ prefers the IO ruling τ io to a trade war, then
so do all types γ′ < γ (recall that T ∗ is a strictly decreasing function). As σ
is an equilibrium, no type that makes a demand in T1 can profitably deviate by
mimicking a type that makes a demand in T2, and vice versa. This implies that
there exists a threshold type γˆ such that all types smaller [resp. larger] than
γˆ belong to T1 [resp. to T2]. This in turn implies that the Home government
learns that the Foreign government’s type is lower [resp. greater] than γˆ when
it receives a demand τ1 ∈ T1 [resp. a demand τ2 ∈ T2]. As W˜ (γ) is a strictly
decreasing function, Bayesian updating then implies that EFτ1
[
W˜ (γ)
]
≥ W˜ (γˆ) ≥
EFτ2
[
W˜ (γ)
]
for all τ1 ∈ T1 and all τ2 ∈ T2. However, in equilibrium, the Home
government prefers τ io to a trade war after rejecting τ1 and (strictly) prefers a
trade war to τ io after rejecting τ2; that is
(A1) W
(
τ io, τ∗0
) ≥ EFτ1 [W˜ (γ)] ≥ EFτ2 [W˜ (γ)] > W (τ io, τ∗0 ) ,
which is of course impossible. This establishes that, in equilibrium σ, the Home
government always complies with the IO ruling after rejecting any τ ∈ T σ.
Now suppose that τ io ≥ T (F0) and τ io > T ∗ (γ), and that there is an equilib-
rium in which some (and therefore all) types make unsuccessful demands. From
Step 3 and the argument in the previous paragraph, we know that all equilibrium
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demands lead to the implementation of τ io. This implies that demand τ io must
be unsuccessful in equilibrium; otherwise all Foreign government’s types would be
indifferent between their equilibrium unsuccessful demands and τ io (and would
therefore choose to demand τ io). This in turn implies that demand τ io is followed
by a trade war; otherwise the Home government would be indifferent between
conceding and not conceding to τ io and, therefore, would choose to concede. By
definition of an equilibrium, no type of Foreign government can profitably deviate
by demanding τ io (thus triggering a trade war); that is: W ∗
(
τ io, τ∗0 , γ
) ≥ W˜ ∗(γ)
or, equivalently, τ io ≤ T ∗(γ) for all γ ∈ [γ, γ]. As T ∗(·) is a strictly decreasing
function, this is equivalent to τ io ≤ T ∗ (γ), thus contradicting the assumption
that τ io > T ∗ (γ).
Step 5: If τ io < T (F0), then: (i) all types of Foreign government fail to obtain
a concession from the Home government; and (ii) the latter never complies with
the IO ruling. Such an equilibrium exists.
Suppose that τ io < T (F0). Part (i) is an immediate consequence of Steps
2 and 3. To prove part (ii), suppose toward a contradiction that there is an
equilibrium in which a nonempty set of types of Foreign government, say Γio, make
unsuccessful demands followed by compliance with τ io. Observe that Γio 6= [γ, γ],
i.e., a nonempty subset of types must make unsuccessful demands followed by
trade wars. To see this, suppose instead that all types’ demands lead the Home
government to comply with τ io. Letting Fτ denote the Home government’s beliefs
following demand τ , this would imply that τ io ≥ T (Fτ ) for all on-the-equilibrium-
path demands τ and, therefore, that τ io ≥ T (F0); thus contradicting τ io < T (F0).
By definition of an equilibrium, γ ∈ Γio if and only if T ∗(γ) ≥ τ io (otherwise
γ could profitably deviate by mimicking a type outside Γio). As T ∗ is a strictly
decreasing function, there exists a threshold type γˆ < γ such that Γio =
[
γ, γˆ
]
.
This implies that, when the Home government receives a demand τ ′ from a type
outside Γio, its updated beliefs F ′ assign a zero probability to the event {γ ≤ γˆ}.
Hence, T (F ′) ≤ T (Fτ ) ≤ τ io for any demand τ made by a type in Γio. But this
implies that the Home government should comply with τ io after rejecting demand
τ ′, yielding the desired contradiction.
We now have to prove that such an equilibrium exists. We argue that the
following strategy profile and system of beliefs constitute an equilibrium: All types
of foreign government demand τ io; the Home government concedes to demand τ
if and only if τ ≥ T (γ); it never complies with the IO ruling; and it believes that
the Foreign government’s type is γ if the latter demands τ 6= τ io, and maintains
its initial beliefs F0 otherwise.
To see that the Foreign government does not have a profitable deviation, observe
that it could only change the equilibrium outcome (i.e. a trade war) by making
a demand τ ≥ T (γ). As T ∗(γ) ≤ T ∗ (γ) < T (γ), this would be unprofitable to
all Foreign government’s types γ ∈ [γ, γ].
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As the Home government’s beliefs are F0 when it receives demand τ
io and
τ io < T (F0), it is optimal for it not comply with ruling τ
io after rejecting demand
τ io. This in turn implies that it is also optimal to reject demand τ io. When
it receives a demand τ 6= τ io, the Home government believes that the Foreign
government is of type γ. As T
(
γ
)
> T (F0) > τ
io, it is optimal for the Home
government to trigger a trade war by rejecting the IO ruling. This in turn implies
that it is a best response to concede to demand τ if and only if τ ≥ T (γ).
Finally, it is readily checked that the Home government’s beliefs satisfy Bayes’
rule whenever possible. Moreover, Lemma 5 in the supplementary appendix shows
that they also satisfy criterion D1.

A3. Proof of Proposition 3
PROOF: We prove Proposition 3 in two steps:
Step 1: There exists an equilibrium in which all types of Foreign government
coerce unilaterally and fail to obtain a concession.
Let κ be a strictly positive number and consider the following strategy profile
and beliefs: The type-γ Foreign government makes unilateral demand τκ(γ) ≡
T (γ)− κ; the Home government concedes to a unilateral demand τ if and only if
τ ≥ T (γ); concedes to a multilateral demand τ if and only if τ ≥ max{T (γ) , τ io};
it complies with the IO ruling if and only if τ io ≥ T (γ); it believes that the For-
eign government is of type γ when it is confronted with unilateral demand τκ(γ),
for all γ ∈ [γ, γ], and that it is of type γ when confronted with any other demand.
To see that these strategy profile and system of beliefs constitute an equilibrium,
note first that the Home government’s beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule
whenever possible. Moreover, Lemma 6 in the supplementary appendix shows
that they are reasonable. The Foreign government can only change the outcome
by making either a unilateral demand τ ≥ T (γ) or a multilateral demand τ ≥
max
{
T
(
γ
)
, τ io
}
. As T ∗(γ) ≤ T ∗ (γ) < T (γ) ≤ max{T (γ) , τ io}, however, such
deviations can only make it worse off. Finally, it is readily checked that, given
its beliefs, the Home government’s strategy is a best response to the Foreign
government’s.
Step 2: In any equilibrium, a trade war arises with a probability of one.
To prove this statement, we will establish in turn that in equilibrium: (i) if all
types of Foreign government make unilateral demands, then the Home govern-
ment never concedes; (ii) if all types make multilateral demands, then the Home
government never concedes to those demands and never complies with the IO
ruling; and (iii) if some types coerce unilaterally and others multilaterally, then
all their demands are unsuccessful and lead to a trade war.
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(i) If all types coerce unilaterally in equilibrium, then by the same argument as
in Proposition 1 they all fail to obtain a concession (all deviations available in the
game without IO are still available). Hence, a trade war ensues for all possible
realizations of the Foreign government’s type.
(ii) Consider an equilibrium in which all types of Foreign government coerce
multilaterally, and suppose (by contradiction) that some type’s demand does not
lead to a trade war. By the same argument as in Proposition 2, this implies
that τ io ≥ T (F0) and that all types’ demands lead to the implementation of τ io.
This in turn implies that τ io ≤ T ∗ (γ) — otherwise the type-γ Foreign government
could profitably deviate by making an unacceptable unilateral demand τ ′ < T (γ).
Lemma 7 in the supplementary appendix shows that, in such a case, reasonable
beliefs must assign a probability of 1 to type γ following any (off-the-equilibrium-
path) unilateral demand τ ′ < τ io.
Now consider a deviation to unilateral demand τ ′ ∈ (T (γ) , τ io) (observe that
T (γ) < T (F0) ≤ τ io). As the Home government believes that this demand
emanates from the type-γ government, it should concede to it. This makes the
deviation profitable for all types of Foreign government.
(iii) Consider an equilibrium in which
[
γ, γ
]
can be partitioned into two nonempty
subsets Γ1 and Γ2 such that all types in Γ1 [resp. Γ2] coerce multilaterally [resp.
unilaterally]. Proceeding by contradiction, assume that in this equilibrium, a
trade war is avoided for some realization of the Foreign government’s type. By
the same argument as in Proposition 1, all types in Γ2 fail to obtain a concession;
so that a trade war occurs if γ ∈ Γ2. Therefore, the types avoiding a trade war
must be in Γ1. By the same argument as in Proposition 2, tariff τ
io must then
be implemented whenever the Foreign government’s type is in Γ1.
By definition of an equilibrium, types in Γ1 cannot profitably deviate by mim-
icking types in Γ2, and vice versa. As T
∗(γ) is strictly decreasing in γ, this implies
that there must be a type γˆ ∈ (γ, γ) such that γˆ = (T ∗)−1 (τ io) and Γ1 = [γ, γˆ].
(γˆ > γ because T ∗
(
γ
)
< T
(
γ
)
; and γˆ < γ because by assumption Γ2 6= ∅.) We
distinguish between two different cases:
(a) If T ∗ (γˆ) ≤ T (γˆ), then we have τ io = T ∗ (γˆ) ≤ T (γˆ) < T (γ) for all γ <
γˆ. This implies that there must a demand τ emanating from some type, or
some subset of types, in Γ1 such that the Home government’s updated beliefs
Fτ satisfy T (Fτ ) > τ
io. This in turn implies that it is optimal for the Home
government to reject both demand τ and ruling τ io in order to trigger a trade
war; a contradiction.
(b) If T ∗ (γˆ) > T (γˆ), then τ io > T (γˆ). Consider a unilateral demand τ ′ ∈(
T (γˆ) , τ io
)
. Observe that this demand is only made off the equilibrium path:
types γ ≤ γˆ make multilateral demands, and types γ > γˆ make unsuccessful
demands (as T (γ) < T (γˆ) < τ ′ for all γ > γˆ, the Home government would
concede to τ ′ if it emanated from types γ > γˆ in equilibrium). Furthermore,
Lemma 8 (in the supplementary appendix) shows that the Home government’s
beliefs F ′ when it receives unilateral demand τ ′ must assign zero probability to the
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event {γ < γˆ}; so that T (F ′) ≤ T (γˆ) < τ ′ (recall that T (γ) is strictly decreasing
in γ). This implies that if some type of Foreign government deviated to unilateral
demand τ ′, then the Home government would concede. As τ ′ < τ io = T ∗ (γˆ), this
deviation is profitable to all types in Γ1 — this is again a contradiction.

*
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